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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
GEORGE SALTAS,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
DAV!D A. AFFLECK, doing business

under the name and style of D. A.
Affleck Grocery,
Defendant.

No. 6190

KENNETH BUTTE,
Defendant and Appellant.

PETITION OF KENNETH BUTTE, ONE OF THE
DEFENDANTS HEREIN, FOR REHEARING
IN THE ABOVE ENTITLED CASE
AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT
THEREOF

PETITION
Comes now Kenneth Butte, appellant herein, and
petitions this Honorable Court to grant a rehearing of
the above cause for the following reasons:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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1. That it appears from the opinion and concurring
opinions herein that the court overlooked the fact that
appellant had settled a wayside bill of exceptions consisting of the entire record of the first trial and that such
record was abstracted in this appellant's abstract of
record, pages 3 to 29, inclusive, with complete record of
settlement thereof at pages 131 to 133, inclusive of said
abstract.
2. That while this Honorable Court correctly states
the rule to be that "a new trial may be granted upon the
court's own motion 'when there has been such a plain
disregard by the jury of the instructions of the court or
the evidence in the case as to satify the court that the
verdict was rendered under a misapprehension of such
instructions or under the influence of passion or prejudice,' " and further correctly held that "the amount the
plaintiff might have received from the deceased was
speculativ~," and further held that "the amount of the verdict is a matter exclusively for the jury" and that "on the
ground of inadequacy of the verdict alone, the court
may not interfere with the jury's verdict," and further
held that "it is seldom that the amount of the verdict,
standing alone, is so inadequate or excessive as to indicate passion or prejudice," it was, nevertheless, held
that the trial court could grant a new trial even though
there was no showing of passion or prejudice and even in
the total absence of showing that the verdict was rendered
under a misapprehension of instructions or evidence.
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3. That while the record on the first trial, contained
in appellant's wayside hill of exceptions and in the
abstract and briefs of plaintiff, George Saltas, discloses
no error and the fact is that the only argument in support of a new trial as against this appellant was based
upon (a) a quotient verdict, and (h) inadequacy of the
verdict, and the trial court, after hearing the sworn
testimony of the jurors, Haddow and Kiepe, held that
there was no quotient verdict (Dft. Ah. p. 28), and although the court was only "inclined to think at this
time that the verdict is too low" hut was uncertain as
to whether he would "find it too low" (Dft. Ah. p. 28),
yet this Honorable court, contrary to the correct rules
set forth in its opinion and supported by all of the authorities under statutes similar to those of Utah, permits the
order granting the new trial to stand by refusing to order
a reinstatement of the original verdict.
4. That while the evidence on the first trial would
have justified a verdict for the defendant, and the proof
of damages (Dft. Ah. pp. 18 to 20, inclusive) would
have sustained a purely nominal verdict, and while the
authorities set forth in the brief of appellant (Brief of
Appellant, Kenneth Butte, pp. 6 to 26, inclusive) clearly
sustain the fact that the verdict was not inadequate, yet
this Honorable Court, after correctly stating the rules
applicable to the. facts, and after correctly pointing out
that plaintiff's damage "was speculative," and without
plaintiff's counsel either in his abstract or brief justifySponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ing the granting of the new trial, failed to set aside the
order granting the same.
5. That the opinion and decision of this Honorable
Court is not justified by the record or by the law but is
contrary to the record duly filed in this court and is contrary to the opinion of the court and the authorities supporting the position of this appellant.
It is believed that a reconsideration of the question
of damages and of the granting of the new trial solely
upon the claimed insufficiency of the verdict will result
in this Honorable Court determining (1) that "the amount
the plaintiff might have received from the deceased was
speculative" and under all the circumstances a verdict of
$800.00 was not inadequate; (2) that there was no showing, or even any contention by plaintiff "that the verdict
was rendered under a misapprehension of such instructions or under the influence of passion or prejudice;"
(3) that the record (Dft. Ab. p. 28) clearly shows that there
were only two questions raised and considered by counsel and the court on the granting of the new trial, and
the court, neither in its statement following the arguments nor in its conditional order, indicated that there
was any error of law or suggestion of passion or prejudice or misapprehension of the court's instruction; {4) that
the trial judge misconceived his duty and erroneously
believed he could disregard the jury's finding of damages
and set up his own ideas against the unanimous verdict
of eight jurors on the first trial and, as it subsequently
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developed, against at least two of the jurors upon the
second trial.

It is submitted that not only in justice to the rights
of this appellant, but as a guide to trial courts in future
cases and to promote and aid the administration of justice,
this court should clearly define the duties of the trial
court as applied to the record in this case and correct
erroneous implications to be deduced from the present
opinion under the facts disclosed by the record.
RALPH T. STEWART,
GERALD IRVINE,
Attorneys for Defendant
Kenneth Butte.

CERTIFICATE
I, RA.LPH T. STEWART, do hereby certify that I
am one of the attorneys for the appellant and petitioner,
Kenneth Butte, and that in my opinion there is good
reason to believe the judgment in the above entitled
cause, and the decision of the Supreme Court insofar as
it affirms the order granting the new trial herein, is
erroneous and that the cause to that extent ought to be
re-examined.
RALPH T. STEWART.
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BRIEF AND ARGUMENT
This defendant, Kenneth Butte, settled his wayside
hill of exceptions, consisting of the entire record on the
first trial, plaintiff's motion for a new trial, defendant's
motion to set aside the conditional order granting a new
trial and defendant's motion to set aside the second
verdict and reinstate the first verdict. (Dft. Ah. pp. 15
to 30, inclusive, and 131 to 137, inclusive).
Appellant, Kenneth Butte, (Dft. Ah. pp. 16 to 28, inclusive) clearly showed that the evidence would have
justified a defendant's verdict and that the plaintiff's
testimony (Dft. Ah. pp. 18 to 20, inclusive) would have
justified a purely nominal verdict.
In presenting his motion for a new trial, plaintiff's
principal contention was that there was a quotient verdict. Affidavits and counter-affidavits were filed and evidence was presented in open court by jury foreman,
Werner Kiep~, and juror, John Haddow. Their testimony was conclusive that there was no quotient verdict,
and the court said (Dft. Ah. 28): "So far as the quotient
verdict is concerned I am inclined to hold aganist Mr.
Metos." In commenting on the insufficiency of the verdict
(the only other question argued) the court was not satisfied that the verdict was insufficient hut said (Dft. Ab.
28): "I do not mean to say by that that I will find it

too low." Had the court, after hearing the evidence and
being famil~ar with the instructions given and other posSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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sihle errors, felt that there had been any misapprehension
of his instructions to the jury, or had he believed that
the jury was influenced by passion or prejudice, he
would have made his position in that respect clear and
mentioned any occurrence during the trial or deliberations of the jury or testimony of the jurors at the time
of the hearing of the motion, and made record of the
fact that he believed the jurors had been improperly
actuated or that some error had been committed or that
the instructions or the evidence had been misunderstood
or misapplied. On the contrary, the court held that there
was no quotient verdict; that there was no evidence to
go to the jury as against the defendant, Affleck, but
that "he was inclined to think that the verdict was
too low."
There is no logical reason under our statute, and certainly no appellate decision under a statute similar to
that of Utah, to justify the court in invading the province
of the jury and directly or indirectly increase the amount
of the verdict. This court has repeatedly held that the
jury is the sole judge of the evidence and the credibility
of the witnesses. It is disclosed in appellant's abstract, and
was even more apparent in open court, that the evidence
of plaintiff on the question of damages was unsatifactory
and subject to question as to its credibility. The jury
could have justifiably concluded that plaintiff's testimony relating to pecuniary loss was not worthy of belief
and that probably the other sons of plaintiff had helped
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to support him while deceased had lived for months away
from home and passed the financial burden to plaintiff's
other sons, Paul and Pete, earning between them $8.65
a day.
We ask the court to again review the authorities at
pages 12 to 26 of the brief of appellant, Kenneth Butte.
Defendant's abstract, page 28, discloses that the application for a new trial was based on "inadequate damages appearing to have been given under the influence
of passion or prejudice." No contention to that effect was
ever asserted. vVe pointed out to this court in the brief of
appellant, Kenneth Butte, page 27, that the statutes make
no provision for the granting of a new trial upon the
sole basis of "inadequate damages." We further pointed
out that a new trial may only be granted "when there
has been a plain disregard by the jury of the instructions
of the court, or the evidence in the case, as to satisfy
the court that the verdict was rendered under a misapprehension of such instructions or under the influence
of passion or prejudice." No such contention was ever
or could be made by plaintiff.
Our purpose in settling the wayside bill of excep·
tions, and particularly in setting forth in our abstract,
page 27, the statement of the court at the conclusion of
the arguments on the motion for a new trial, was to make
perfectly clear to this court that plaintiff did not contend
that there was a disregard of instructions or of evidence,
hut, on the contrary, no such contention was asserted by
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plaintiff's counsel or considered by the court. The record
repudiates any finding to the contrary.
The opinion of this court, concurred in by Justices
Larson and Pratt, correctly states the rule under our
statute and under the statutes in other states identical or
similar to ours. It is undoubtedly true as this court states
"that the amount of the verdict is a matter exclusively
for the jury," when inadequacy only is relied upon. It
is likewise true, as the opinion states, "on the ground of
inadequacy of the verdict alone, the court may not interfere with the jury's verdict." It is also the rule, as stated
in the opinion, that ••it is seldom that the amount of the
verdic~ standing alone, is so inadequate or excessive as
to indicate passion or prejudice" and ••in order to eliminate speculation as to the basi~ of the exercise of judicial
discretion in granting new trials, the record should show
the reasons and make it clear the court is not invading
the province of the jury."
The trial court, in granting the new trial in this
case, not only failed to ••indicate wherein there was a
plain disregard by the jury of the instructions of the
court or the evidence or what constituted bias or prejudice on the part of the jury" hut, by his statement following the arguments, affirmatively showed that no error
of court or jury was relied on but that he was merely
expressing his own personal views concerning the amount
as opposed to the jury's finding. In other words, the trial
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judge not only failed to make clear any reasons justifying an inference of disregard on the part of the jury,
hut expressed, inferentially at least, that there was no
failure on the part of the jury to do anything other than
fail to return a verdict of a size which the court would
have found had the trial been to the court.
The prevailing opinion suggests that "it may be
there was sufficient in the record of the former trial to
justify the trial court in concluding the jury had disregarded or misconceived the instructions given or the evidence." If such he the case why did plaintiff's counsel
not argue to the trial court the record justifying such
conclusion? If such he the case why did the trial court
not point out such record or comment on it either in
his statement from the bench following the arguments or
in his conditional order increasing the verdict? If such be
the case why did not plaintiff's counsel either in his brief
or in his argument to this court point out from the record
or otherwise justify a conclusion that the jury disregarded or misconceived the instructions or the evidence?
The entire record is before this court. Appellant,
Kenneth Butte, takes the position that upon submission
of such record and a showing that no questions of passion
or prejudice or disregard of instructions or evidence were
pointed out or argued either to the trial court or to this
court, and in pointing out that on the contrary the trial
court did not in any way consider such questions, has
cast the burden upon the plaintiff to establish that the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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trial court in fact based his ruling upon some grounds
justifying his judicial right to interfere with the jury's
verdict.
Damages in the sum of $800.00 under the facts in
this case are not sufficiently inadequate "to cause the
court to think the verdict was the result of bias or prejudice." Probably no two of twenty lawyers, or twenty
judges, or twenty jurors, would ever arrive at the same
verdict. One judge, on the same evidence, might feel that
an $800.00 verdict was excessive, while another might
argue that a $2400.00 verdict was inadequate. One judge
might say that when deceased's father testified that "deceased was the only one who helped and was his sole support," although admitting on cross-examination that he
himself earned $4.25 a day and that two other sons earned
$5.00 and $3.65 a day, respectively, was falsifying, while
another judge might believe such testimony. As a matter
of fact plaintiff did in important respects vary substantially from the truth in testifying concerning financial
assistance and approached the truth only when confronted
with information from his employer that rental and other
expenses were deducted from the pay checks of a son
other than deceased.
The jury sitting on the first trial was composed of
several level headed, intelligent businessmen, including
Mr. Kiepe, former secretary of the Real Estate Board.
These jurors saw through plaintiff's effort to make it
appear that deceased was the sole financial contributor.
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They appreciated that deceased had helped financially
until Paul and Pete had secured positions and become
able to take over the burden which their elder brother
had carried long enough and enable him to purchase an
automobile, take a trip to California and, at the age of
thirty, be free to plan on marriage. These jurors evidently
appreciated that the amount, if any, which deceased
would have contributed in the future was purely problematical and, as this court says, "speculative" and, in
view of plaintiff's own earnings and earnings of Paul
and Pete, it was unlikely deceased would have continued
even with such questionable support as he had given
his father in the past. No special damages of any kind
were pleaded or proved.
Under these circumstances, and with a total absence
of any contention that the verdict was the result of prejudice or passion, and without any contention that there was
any misapprehension by the jury of the instructions or
the evidence, we again urgently insist that the trial court
erroneously undertook to set up his feelings or opinion as
against those of the jurors and invaded the province of
the jury in its exclusive right to determine the credibility
of the witnesses and the effect of all the evidence.

If the action of the Honorable Trial Judge, mistakenly taken by him in this case, is sustained, it means,
as we firmly believe, that a trial court may in any case,
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regardless of the facts, grant a new trial if he is "inclined
to think that the verdict is too low."
We respectfully urge the court to read the testimony
of plaintiff (Pff. Tr. pp. 322 to 342, inclusive) on the first
trial (Dft. Ah. pp. 18 to 20, inclusive); also plaintiff's
testimony on the second trial (Dft. Tr. pp. 133 to 252,
inclusive; Dft. Ah. pp. 71 to 85, inclusive). Plaintiff first
testified that deceased was the only one that helped. He
testified that all the rent was paid by or charged to deceased. He testified that deceased lived at home all the
time. He later testified on cross-examination that Spero
lived at Cyprus Hall for several months. He later testified that Paul paid the rent; that since 1935 the rent was
turned to Paul. He also admitted (Dft. Ah. 76) that Utah
Copper charged the rent to Paul's check. He also admitted (Dft. Ah. 77) that the coal was deducted from
Spero's check and the rent from Paul's, so, in fact, as
early as 1937 Paul was paying the largest expense item.
Plaintiff did not remember how long deceased lived at
Cyprus Hall. He was sure deceased did not live there
from April 1, 1935, to March 10, 1936, "because I don't
remember so long." Many things plaintiff could not or
did not want to remember. In view of such testimony was
it not for the jury to determine whether plaintiff should
he believed on the question of damages? Was the pecuniary loss, if any, not peculiarly for the determination of
the jury, particularly in view of plaintiff's age, the existence of several other children, the fact that plaintiff was
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regularly employed and had two surviving sons regularly employed?
WHEREFORE, we respectfully pray that this court
grant appellant, Kenneth Butte, the right to orally present this petition for rehearing and that a reconsideration and rehearing be granted him.
RALPH T. STEWART,
GERALD IRVINE,
Attorneys for Appellant,
Kenneth Butte.
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